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FEDERAL COURTS-Appellate Jurisdiction-When a District
Court Has Stayed a Claim Involving Concurrent Jurisdiction,
Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus Compelling
Adjudication Is Improper
Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,
-U.S.-,
98 S. Ct. 2552, 57 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1978).
American Mutual Reinsurance Company brought suit against Calvert
Fire Insurance Company in a state court alleging that Calvert had illegally
terminated its membership in American's reinsurance pool. Calvert filed
a counterclaim alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933,
state securities law, and common law fraud. On the same day Calvert filed
suit in federal district court, alleging a violation of rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, over which federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction, as well as the same claims alleged in the state court counterclaim. American's motion to abate the federal suit was substantially
granted when the district court judge stayed all aspects of the proceeding
pending the outcome of the state claim, and refused to rule on Calvert's
claim for damages under the 1934 Act. Calvert sought and obtained from
the court of appeals a writ of mandamus compelling immediate adjudication of the exclusively federal claim.' Judge Will appealed the issuance of
the writ to the United States Supreme Court. Held-Reversed. When a
federal district judge has stayed a proceeding involving concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction and an exclusively federal claim, issuance of a writ
3
of mandamus compelling adjudication is improper.
The history of the writ of mandamus is still unwritten.4 Prior to the time
of the Tudors in England the writ was little more than an administrative
order from superiors to subordinates directing them to supply information.2 In the seventeenth century the King's Bench adapted the writ for
legal purposes.' The writ was issued in the King's name from the high court
requiring a person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature to do a
specific act.7 The writ of mandamus was brought into American federal
jurisprudence by the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 Presently, courts are empow1. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 aa (1970)(violations of rule lOb-5 within exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts).
2. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, -U.S.__,
98 S. Ct. 2552, 57 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1978). Calvert sought both a reversal of the stay order and
an order compelling immediate adjudication of claims not formally stayed. Id. at 794.
3. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., -. U.S.....
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2559, 57 L. Ed. 2d
504, 513-14 (1978).
4. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 173 (5th ed. 1956).
5. Id. at 173.

6. Id. at 173.
7. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 229 (7th ed. 1966).
8. 1 Stat. 81 (1789)(no longer in force). See generally Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the
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ered to issue the writ by the All Writs Act which provides that "all courts
established by Congress may issue writs when it is necessary and appropriate to aid their respective jurisdictions."' Generally, mandamus is used as
an aid to appellate jurisdiction either by ordering a court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction or by compelling it to accept it."0 The most significant limitation on the power to issue the writ of mandamus is that the writ
will not lie to control or direct acts that are within the judicial discretion
of the lower courts, unless an abuse of the right of discretion is present."
The major problem facing the courts is the question what constitutes
abuse of discretion.' 2 One court has attempted to frame a test, but by its
very nature the concept of abuse of discretion defies precise definition.'3
The use of mandamus to compel a trial court to exercise its jurisdiction
after it has granted a stay in the proceeding has been a source of frequent
litigation.' The power to stay a pending case is regarded as incidental to
the power inherent in every court to control its own docket with economy
of time and effort for all parties to the litigation. 5 Generally, a stay in the
proceeding will be granted to await development of the issues or to force
Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice? 40 IND. L.J. 99, 114-15 (1965). Sections
13 and 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred upon all courts of the United States power
to issue all writs not specifically provided for elsewhere. Id. at 114-15.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (traditional use of
writ to confine or compel court to exercise jurisdiction); Atchley v. Taylor, 169 F.2d 626, 637
(6th Cir. 1948)(mandamus is appropriate remedy to compel inferior court to exercise duty
imposed); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 148 F.2d 731, 732 (8th Cir. 1945)(traditional use of writ to compel exercise of jurisdiction).
11. See Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958)(writ limited to
governing of ministerial acts). But see In~reEvans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975)(mandamus will not lie to correct mere abuse of discretion). See generally 15 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL
PROCEDuRE § 84.44, at 349 (3d ed. 1976).

12. See, e.g., Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 1956) (abuse of
discretion occurs when trial court refuses to apply law to conceded or undisputed facts), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954) (abuse of
discretion is clear error in judgment in conclusion reached upon weighing of relevant factors);
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Huffman, 134 F.2d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1943) (abuse of discretion
is arbitrary action by reason of failure to apply appropriate equitable and legal principles to
established or conceded facts).
13. See Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942). In Delno the court
reasoned that abuse of discretion occurs only when reasonable men could not differ on the
outcome. In contrast, if the court exercised its discretion in such a way that minds would
differ then no abuse was evident. Id. at 967.
14. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 251 (1957) (mandamus properly granted to overturn court's deference to master in antitrust suit); Bankers Life & Cas.
v. :Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1956) (mandamus inappropriate to compel court to vacate
severance and transfer order); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 283 (1910) (mandamus
proper to overturn stay).
15. See, e.g., Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); Kansas City S. Ry.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763-64 (1931); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F. 2d 750,
755 (7th Cir. 1970).
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the parties to bring a state court action to secure a definitive determination
of a state law.'" Since the mere existence of jurisdiction should not be
construed as meaning that it must be exercised, 7 the power of a federal
district court to stay, pending the outcome of a state proceeding has been
upheld even when the issue involved is an exclusively federal claim." In
Aetna State Bank v. Altheirner5 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld a district court stay of an action brought under rule 10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20 The stay was justified as a means
of controlling the disposition of cases on the district court's docket with
economy of time and effort.' In a later decision involving the identical fact
situation the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a writ of mandamus to overturn the stay and compelled the district court to adjudicate the
federal suit immediately." The court stated that no interest-state, federal, or that of the litigants-was served by staying the federal case. 3
Both stays and dismissals may be granted pursuant to the doctrine of
abstention. Under this doctrine a federal district court may decline or
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction." Abstention has been described
as an "extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court
to adjudicate a controversy properly before it."" ' In ColoradoRiver Water
16. See 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.20, at 249 (2d ed. 1975). See generally Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
17. Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931). The question whether
to stay a proceeding pending outcome of an earlier suit for the same purpose is within the
discretion of the district court. Id. at 763-64. But cf. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction when
conferred exclusively).
18. See Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970). Contra, Cotler
v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975).
19. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
20. Id. at 758.
21. Id. at 755.
22. See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 542; see McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910); Mottolese v. Kaufman,
176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1110.28, at 309 (2d ed. 1975).
Mandamus is looked upon with favor as an effective exercise of federal appellate jurisdiction
in the proper case particularly when an exclusively federal issue is involved. Id. at 309. But
see W. BARRON, A HoLTzosv & C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 64, at 352
(1960); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 815, 824-27 (1959).
The.writ of mandamus is seen as a nuisance to the growing doctrine of abstention, which is
viewed as a step forward in the administration of the federal courts. See W. BARRON, A.
HoLTzoFF & C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 64, at 352. Professor Wright
believes that broad discretion should be given the trial courts in the exercise of abstention
but warns against its use merely as a convenience for a federal court. See Wright, The
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAs L. REV. 815, 824-27 (1959). He reasons that,
unless a trial court can cite a valid legal reason for abstaining, abstention is both improper
and an abuse of a potentially valuable jurisdictional tool. See id. at 826-27.
24. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
25. Id. at 188-89.
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ConservationDistrict v. United States2 the Supreme Court set out three
categories of situations in which abstention is proper,2 but recognized that
in exceptional circumstances "dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration" may be appropriate."8 The court upheld a dismissal by the district
court as such an "exceptional circumstance," 2' but indicated that had this
suit involved concurrent jurisdiction in which an exclusively federal claim
was present, the district court would have had an "unflagging obligation"
to assume jurisdiction.'"
In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co."' Calvert had sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the district court to proceed to adjudicate a claim
based upon the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.32 The Court stated that
for the writ to be issued in a case involving a review of an interlocutory
order, the petitioner has "the burden of showing that its right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable."33 In considering whether that
burden had been fulfilled by Calvert, the Court, following the holding in
Brilihart v. Excess Insurance Co.,3" placed great emphasis on the discretionary powers of a district court to defer to a state court when there is
concurrent pending litigation.3 5 It was observed that the normally excessive
workload of a trial court makes it imperative that it be allowed to handle
and clear the docket without appellate intervention as long as the time
delay is not extraordinary. 31 The Court distinguished Colorado River, reasoning that unlike a dismissal, an order deferring a proceeding can be
reconsidered on the basis of new information revealed during the progress
of the state case. 7 The fact that there had been no formal stay of Calvert's
26. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).

27. See id. at 814-17. The categories in which abstention would be deemed proper
were: cases in which federal constitutional issue is involved and a state court's determination of the issue would be mooted or seen in a different light because of some pertinent state
law; cases which involve a question of state law bearing on policy problems of public import
which transcend the result of the instant case; and cases in which federal jurisdiction has
been invoked to restrain state criminal proceedings. Id. at 814-17.
28. Id. at 817.
29. Id. at 821.
30. See id. at 817.
31.
-U.S.-._.,
98 S. Ct. 2552, 57 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1978).
32. Mandamus is generally viewed as an extraordinary remedy that should be reserved
for extraordinary situations. See, e.g., Will v. United States 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (review of
trial court's interlocutory order in criminal case not deemed as warranting extraordinary
remedy of mandamus); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957)(writ issued
to.compel district court to adjudicate antitrust suits); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60
(1947)(use of writ to enjoin payment of attorneys fees deemed misuse of mandamus).
33. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., U.S.....
-,
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2557, 57 L. Ed. 2d
504, 511 (1978); see Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953).
34. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
35. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., U.S.....
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2558, 57 L. Ed. 2d

504, 513 (1978).
36. Id. at

__,

37. Id. at

-,

98 S. Ct. at 2559, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 513.
98 S. Ct. at 2559, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 513 (deferral not equivalent to dis-
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claim for rule 10b-5 damages was emphasized;" thus, the Court avoided
addressing the question whether the grant of exclusive jurisdiction should
obligate the district court to proceed."
The four dissenting justices argued that the language in Colorado River
limited the doctrine of abstention to three narrow categories.4 ' Concern was
expressed with the majority's disregard for the explicit language set out in
Colorado River concerning a federal court's "unflagging obligation" to assume jurisdiction and adjudicate." It was further expressed that since the
instant case involved an exclusively federal question the obligation to adjudicate became more imperative." Brilihart on which the majority had
relied, was distinguished on two grounds. First, it was noted that the
question in Brillhartwas not one of exclusive federal jurisdiction.4 ' Second,
Brillhart involved a suit for a declaratory judgment." The dissenting justices concluded that Judge Will had abused his power of discretion and
that therefore the writ was the proper remedy for rectifying this judicial
wrong.' 5 Countering the majority's reliance on the fact that there had been
no technical stay, the dissenting justices asserted that the lengthy delay
involved in adjudicating the federal claim was equivalent to a formal
stay."
missal). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit had equated the language in Colorado River concerning a dismissal to apply to any deference to a state court. Circumstances which would justify
such a deference were deemed to be: "1) assumption of jurisdiction over a res by the state
court; 2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; 3) the inconvenience of the federal
forum; and 4) the order in which concurrent jurisdiction was obtained." Calvert Fire Ins. Co.
v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, ___U.S.-., 98 S. Ct. 2552, 57 L. Ed.2d
504 (1978).
U.S .....
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2559-60, 57 L. Ed.
38. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 2d 504, 514 (1978).
39. Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 2559-60, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 514.
, 98 S. Ct. at 2563, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at _
98 S. Ct, at 2563, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 2563, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Congress
42. Id. at -,
expressed legislative intent for uniformity by expressly conferring federal jurisdiction).
43. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 2562, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brillhart was a diversity action in which state, rather than federal law, governed. Brillhart v.
Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2562, 57 L. Ed. 2d
U.S ....
44. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 504, 517 (1978). (Brennan, J., dissenting). In declaratory judgment suits the court declares
98 S. Ct. at 2662, 57 L. Ed.
the rights and legal relations of the parties involved. Id. at -,
2d at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 S. Ct. at 2564-65, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
45. Id. at -,
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 257 (1957).
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result stating that the issuance of the writ was
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2560, 57 L. Ed.
U.S.__.
premature. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 2d 504, 515 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger filed a brief dissent
agreeing with Justice Brennan, but also stating that he found it unnecessary to raise the issue
of res judicata. Id. at -_,98 S.Ct. at 2560-61, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
98 S. Ct. at 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at -,
The dissenting justices offered a second reason to justify their position that the lack of a
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Congress by specifically placing the words "exclusive jurisdiction" into
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, demonstrated a legislative intent to
achieve greater uniformity of construction and litigation.,7 Allowing a trial
court to stay a proceeding involving an exclusively federal claim could
operate to frustrate this intent, in light of the possible res judicata effect
of the state court's finding. " Res judicata effect could apply to bar relitigation of any factual issues pertinent to the rule 10b-5 claim that had already
been adjudicated in the state court." Thus, the fact that the state court
could not directly pass on the question of the rule 10b-5 claim because of
exclusive federal jurisdiction" does not provide an adequate safeguard to
protect Congress' legislative intent of uniformity of construction. In addition to this frustration, the res judicata dilemma would also in essence
deny the right to a federal forum. 5' The right of a party to have his federal
claims decided in a federal forum cannot be denied." The United States
Supreme Court has never resolved the question whether res judicata principles should apply in a suit involving both concurrent jurisdiction and an
exclusively federal claim.53 Although the Second Circuit has indicated that
technical stay was immaterial. It was pointed out that the district court had "indicated that
it would give the state court's determination that the disputed transaction did not involve
a 'security' within the meaning of the 1934 Act res judicata effect ... thereby depriving
Calvert of a federal court determination of a legal issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts." Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITES REGULATMONS 997 (2d ed. 1961). Professor Loss draws this
conclusion because the 1934 Act is much more complicated, thus much easier to misinterpret
than the 1933 Act. Therefore he argues Congress must have expressly made it exclusively a
federal question. On the floor of the House, Rep. Rayburn of Texas stated, "We thought the
bill as drawn meant exclusive, but in order that it be entirely clear we offer this amendment."
See id. at 997 (citing 78 CONG. REc. 8099 (1934)).
48. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., U.S .....
98 S. Ct. 2552, 2561, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 504, 516 (1978)(Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclusive jurisdiction evinces a legislative
desire for uniform federal interpretation).
49. See Osadchy v.'Gans, 436 F. Supp. 677, 683 (D.N.J. 1977)(fact issues in rule 10b-5
case at state level can be given res judicata effect in subsequent federal suit); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 63. (N.D. Ohio 1959) (state determination of rule 10b-5 claim given
res judicata effect). See generally Comment, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
and the Effects of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REv. 1360, 1370-82 (1967);
Comment, The Res Judicataand Collateral Estoppel Effect of PriorState Suits on Actions
Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 69 YALE L.J. 606, 606-14 (1960)., In Will, the dissenting justices
observed that the district court had indicated that it would give res judicata effect to the state
court's finding whether a 'security' was involved in the transaction. Calvert would thereby
have been deprived of a federal court determination of his federal claim. See Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., U.S
.
98 S.Ct. 2552, 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d 504, 521 (1978) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
51. See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 60 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
52. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,415 (1964);
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909).
53. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., U.S. _ _ 98 S.Ct. 2552, 2564, 57 L. Ed. 2d
504, 519 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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exclusive federal issues should be immune from prejudgment elsewhere, 5'
other courts have held otherwise."
Because of the possible res judicata problems, the majority's distinction
between the dismissal in Colorado River and the stay in Will with regard
to possible reconsideration based on new information seems rather artificial. 5 If the issues cannot be relitigated then a stay is equivalent to a
dismissal, and when the stay results in an extended delay as in Will, the
similarity is even more striking. 7 The strong possibility that res judicata
could operate to bar further adjudication of Calvert's federal suit should
be sufficient to evidence the impropriety of the stay."
In Will, the issues had more than a sufficient opportunity to await new

developments" and being an exclusively federal claim with regard to rule

10b-5, no determination of state law was forthcoming.60 Thus, the usual
reasons to justify a stay, namely, awaiting new developments and forcing
a state court action to obtain a definitive state ruling,"' are not available
to lend credence in the instant case.
The writ of mandamus is not limited to aiding jurisdiction already acquired but extends to cases such as Will in which the petitioner's chance
for appeal is obstructed by a stay in the litigation. 2 It is well established
that mandamus will lie to correct abuse of discretion," including improper
deference to pending state proceedings." The Court in Will stated that one
54. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (prejudgment to have no effect on exclusive federal question), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1953).
55. See Osadchy v. Gans, 436 F. Supp. 677, 683 (D.N.J. 1977) (fact issues in rule 10b-5
cases at state level can be given res judicata effect in subsequent federal suit); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1959)(state determination of rule 10b-5 claim given
res judicata effect)..
98 S.Ct. 2552, 2558-59, 57 L.
56. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., -. U.S.....
Ed. 2d 504, 513 (1978).
57. See id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2565, 57 L. Ed,2d at 521 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. See Osadchy v. Gans, 346 F. Supp. 677, 683 (D.N.J. 1977); Connelly v. Balkwill,
174 F. Supp. 49, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
U.S.
.
98 S.Ct. 2552, 2565, 57 L.
59. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., Ed. 2d 504, 521 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (case before district court for two and onehalf years without any action).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) (confers exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts for rule
10b-5 claims).
61. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20, at 249 (2d ed. 1975). See generally,
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90,95 (1967).
. 62. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943)(writ of mandamus can
be used before court of issuance has jurisdiction).
63. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959)(mandamus
used to compel judge to conduct jury trial); Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526
F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975) (mandamus granted to overturn discretionary stay); Duffy v.
Dier, 465 F.2d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1972) (mandamus properly issued to compel disclosure of
informants).
64. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1910). In McClellan a federal court that
had concurrent jurisdiction with a state court ordered a stay deferring to the state forum. The

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

